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                       OPINION OF THE COURT 
                                       
 
NYGAARD, Circuit Judge. 
         This case involves a dispute over the appropriate 
bargaining unit at a health care center resulting from the merger 
of five separate hospitals.  Presbyterian University Hospital 
d/b/a University of Pittsburgh Medical Center filed this 
petition for review of a final order of the National Labor 
Relations Board.  The NLRB cross-petitioned for enforcement of 
its order.  The union intervened in support of the NLRB's order.  
We conclude that there is substantial evidence in the record to 
support the NLRB's finding that four telecommunications workers 
are skilled maintenance employees.  We also conclude that the 
NLRB did not abuse its discretion to determine the appropriate 
unit when it found that the telecommunications workers at the 
Presbyterian complex share a community of interest with the 
skilled maintenance employees in the existing bargaining unit, 
separate from the skilled maintenance employees at the Montefiore 
complex.  We will therefore deny UPMC's petition for review and 
grant the NLRB's petition for enforcement of its order. 
                                I. 
         UPMC is a private, non-profit, acute care medical 
center consisting of approximately forty buildings.  UPMC 
resulted from a series of mergers that began in 1989 between five 
independent hospitals:  Presbyterian and Montefiore University 
Hospitals (both acute care hospitals), Eye and Ear Hospital, The 
Falk Clinic, and Western Psychiatric Institute and Clinic.  
Bridges and tunnels connect the main buildings of this center.  
As a result of the merger, UPMC has one board of directors, one 
president, and centralized scheduling and materials management 
systems.  Before the mergers the five hospitals operated under 
separate licenses; UPMC now operates under a single operating 
license issued by the Pennsylvania Department of Health. 
         Since 1972, the union has represented skilled 
maintenance employees at the Presbyterian complex.  In August 
1993, the union sought to add four employees to the existing 
skilled maintenance unit through a self-determination election.  
These four employees work in the Information Services Division at 
UPMC's Presbyterian complex and have the job title of 
"Telecommunications Specialists (Voice) I."  Telecommunications 
workers are responsible for installation, support and maintenance 
of UPMC's telephone network and work primarily at the 
Presbyterian complex where the existing unit employees are 
located. 
         UPMC opposed the union's representation, asserting that 
the telecommunications workers were not properly included in the 
skilled maintenance employees' bargaining unit, as defined by the 
NLRB's final rule governing the appropriate units in an acute 
care hospital, 29 C.F.R.  103.30(a)(5).  UPMC further asserted 
that, even if the telecommunications workers properly could be 
included in that unit, a self-determination election must also 
include UPMC's unrepresented, skilled maintenance employees at 
the Montefiore complex. 
         After a hearing, the Regional Director issued a 
Direction of Election, determining that the telecommunications 
workers were skilled maintenance employees and that they shared a 
community of interest with the employees in the existing unit.  
In a second hearing, the Director addressed the issue of whether 
all of UPMC's remaining unrepresented skilled maintenance 
employees, located at the Montefiore complex, must be included in 
the voting group with the telecommunications workers in order to 
have a proper residual election.  The Director concluded that the 
election did not have to include these Montefiore employees, 
because they worked at a separate facility and UPMC had not 
overcome the NLRB's single facility presumption. 
         On review, the NLRB determined that the Director 
properly included the telecommunications workers in the existing 
skilled maintenance unit.  The NLRB also determined that the 
unrepresented skilled maintenance employees located at the 
Montefiore complex need not be included with the 
telecommunications workers from the Presbyterian complex in order 
to have a proper election.  According to the NLRB, although the 
Director had incorrectly applied the single facility presumption, 
the existing skilled maintenance unit was still appropriately 
considered a multi-facility unit.  See Presbyterian Univ. Hosp., 
313 N.L.R.B. 1341, 1341-42 (1994).  By order of June 1, 1994, 
based on the telecommunications employees' self-determination 
election, the Director certified the Union as their collective 
bargaining representative and included those employees in the 
existing skilled maintenance unit. 
         The union then requested bargaining with UPMC 
concerning the telecommunications workers, but UPMC refused to 
recognize the union in order to obtain review of the NLRB's 
decision.  As expected, the union filed an unfair labor practice 
charge.  In August 1994, the Regional Director issued a Complaint 
and Notice of Hearing on the matter and the General Counsel filed 
a motion for summary judgment.  The NLRB granted the motion, 
finding that UPMC violated  8(a)(1) & (5) of the National Labor 
Relations Act, 29 U.S.C.  158(a)(1) & (5), by refusing to 
bargain concerning the telecommunications employees. 
                               II. 
         The NLRB's interpretation of the Act normally is 
entitled to deference and should be upheld if it is rational.  
St. Margaret Memorial Hosp. v. NLRB, 991 F.2d 1146, 1151 (3d Cir. 
1993).  We uphold its factual findings if they are "supported by 
substantial evidence on the record as a whole." Id. at 1152.  
Because this case involves the NLRB's unit determination, we note 
that a unit may still be upheld on review even if it is not the 
"most appropriate" unit.  See American Hosp. Ass'n v. NLRB, 499 
U.S. 606, 610, 111 S. Ct. 1539, 1542 (1991).  "Whether a unit is 
appropriate involves a large measure of informed discretion 
vested in the Board and is rarely to be disturbed."  St. 
Margaret, 991 F.2d at 1152 (internal quotations omitted).  
Therefore, UPMC must fight an uphill battle "to show that the 
Board abused its discretion in determining the appropriateness of 
the bargaining unit in question." Id. (internal quotations 
omitted).  See also NLRB v. New Enterprise Stone and Lime Co., 
413 F.2d 117, 118 (3d Cir. 1969). 
         The Act expressly delegates responsibility for unit 
determination to the NLRB.  29 U.S.C.  159(b) provides, in 
pertinent part: 
         The Board shall decide in each case whether, 
         in order to assure to employees the fullest 
         freedom in exercising the rights guaranteed 
         by this subchapter, the unit appropriate for 
         the purposes of collective bargaining shall 
         be the employer unit, craft unit, plan unit, 
         or subdivision thereof . . . . 
As a result, "[t]he Board may develop and apply rules regarding 
appropriate units to circumscribe and to guide its discretion." 
St. Margaret, 991 F.2d at 1152. 
         Special concerns regarding the undue proliferation of 
bargaining units in the health care industry prompted the NLRB to 
adopt a final rule.  As to acute care hospitals, this final rule 
provides the appropriate job classifications: 
         Except in extraordinary circumstances and in 
         circumstances in which there are existing 
         non-conforming units, the following shall be 
         appropriate units, and the only appropriate 
         units, except that if sought by labor 
         organizations, various combinations of units 
         may also be appropriate: 
              (1) All registered nurses. 
              (2) All physicians. 
              (3) All professionals except for 
              registered nurses and physicians. 
              (4) All technical employees. 
              (5) All skilled maintenance employees. 
              (6) All business office clerical 
              employees. 
              (7) All guards. 
              (8) All nonprofessional employees except 
              for technical employees, skilled 
              maintenance employees, business office 
              clerical employees, and guards. 
29 C.F.R.  103.30(a).  The NLRB, in exercising its discretion 
through the rulemaking process, heeded the congressional 
"admonition" in the legislative history to the 1974 Amendments 
(which brought acute care hospitals within the ambit of the Act) 
to give due consideration to preventing undue proliferation of 
bargaining units in the health care industry.  American Hosp. 
Ass'n v. NLRB, 499 U.S. 606, 616-17, 111 S.Ct. 1539, 1545 (1991) 
(upholding the final rule as based on substantial evidence and 
supported by reasoned analysis).   
         The legislative history to the 1974 Amendments raised 
concerns regarding unit scope issues.  As reflected in the 
rulemaking record, "[t]he Board justified its selection of the 
individual bargaining units by detailing the factors that 
supported generalizations as to the appropriateness of those 
units."  American Hosp. Ass'n, 499 U.S. at 619, 111. S. Ct. at 
1546.  For example, the NLRB considered past adjudicatory 
decisions in which units of RNs, technical employees and skilled 
maintenance employees consistently recurred.  See Collective 
Bargaining in the Health Care Industry, 53 Fed. Reg. 33900, 33903 
(Sept. 1, 1988) (second notice of proposed rulemaking).  The 
first notice of proposed rulemaking indicated that  
         [t]he Board has in the last 13 years received 
         many hundreds of petitions for health care 
         units.  Generally, the units requested have 
         been in approximately six, predictable 
         groupings:  registered nurses, other 
         professional employees, technical employees, 
         busines[s] office clerical employees, and 
         skilled maintenance employees. . . . It is 
         our observation that these groups of 
         employees generally exhibit the same internal 
         characteristics, and relationship to other 
         groups of employees, in one health care 
         facility as do like groups of employees at 
         other facilities. 
52 Fed. Reg. 25143-44.  Therefore, in promulgating the final 
rule, the NLRB exercised its discretion to avoid case by case 
adjudication concerning unit scope issues.  See 52 Fed. Reg. 
25145. 
                               III. 
         UPMC first challenges the NLRB's decision to classify 
the four telecommunications workers as skilled maintenance 
employees.  The NLRB adopted the Director's decision that they 
were properly classified as skilled maintenance employees under 
the final rule, 29 C.F.R.  103.30(a)(5).  313 N.L.R.B. at 1341.  
The Director considered the following relevant factors:  function 
and skill level of the telecommunications workers; education, 
licensing and training; supervision; wages, hours and working 
conditions; interaction with other employees; labor market and 
career path; whether they worked on the physical plant; and 
whether their tasks involve equipment and systems. 
         In exhaustive detail, the Director explained why he 
considered the telecommunications workers skilled maintenance 
employees.  Identifying the specific tasks that these workers 
have in common with unit employees, the Director found that:  the 
telecommunications workers perform work functions that relate to 
maintenance of the physical plant; their job requires one to 
three years of experience; their work involves installing wiring 
and repairing telephones; they are required to have a high school 
diploma and one to three years of experience; their wage rates 
compare to that of other unit employees; they work daylight 
hours; and they interact regularly with other unit employees, 
especially electricians.  Based on these findings, which are 
supported by substantial evidence, the Director determined and 
the NLRB agreed that the telecommunications workers were skilled 
maintenance employees who shared a community of interest with the 
existing unit employees. 
         UPMC argues that the telecommunications workers do not 
work on its physical plant, but instead work on its information 
systems network.  This distinction is artificial.  The employees 
install the wiring and jacks, which are "woven into the physical 
plant just as firmly as the wiring and outlets that form the 
electrical system are woven into it. . . . [A] telephone system 
is an integral part of the physical plant."  NLRB Brief at 30. 
         UPMC characterizes the telecommunications workers as 
unskilled, even though they use some of the same tools as other 
unit employees, their installation work is similar to that 
performed by the electricians, and their job requires that they 
diagnose telecommunications equipment malfunctions and determine 
whether that equipment should be repaired or replaced.  The mere 
fact that these employees are unlicensed and uncertified does not 
automatically exclude them from the unit; other unit members, 
such as painters and plasterers, are uncredentialed, yet they are 
considered skilled.  UPMC also contends that the 
telecommunications workers should be excluded because they have 
different immediate supervisors than the existing unit employees, 
but the NLRB weighed this factor and determined it was 
insufficient. 
         The telecommunications workers are required to have 
experience with a major telephone or interconnect company, 
perform tests on telephone wiring and equipment and work 
alongside unit employees, especially electricians, because 
telephone wiring is often routed in close proximity to electrical 
wiring.  We find substantial evidence to support the NLRB's 
determination that the telecommunications workers constitute 
"skilled maintenance employees." 
         Because the majority of the telecommunications workers' 
assignments are within the Presbyterian complex, the NLRB found 
it appropriate to include them in the existing skilled 
maintenance unit of employees at the Presbyterian complex.  We 
hold that the NLRB did not abuse its discretion by determining 
that the four telecommunications workers appropriately could be 
added to the existing skilled maintenance unit through a self- 
determination election. 
                               IV. 
         UPMC next argues that even if the NLRB correctly 
allowed the telecommunications workers to vote on joining the 
existing unit, it could not properly allow them to vote without 
opening the election up to all of UPMC's skilled maintenance 
employees; therefore, the NLRB, by not also including the 
Montefiore skilled maintenance employees in the election, ignored 
its own rule and abused its discretion. 
         In determining whether the NLRB followed its own final 
rule or abused its discretion in defining the appropriate unit 
for the self-determination election, we are mindful of the NLRB's 
broad powers to determine appropriate bargaining units, Libbey- 
Owens-Ford Co. v. NLRB, 495 F.2d 1195, 1199 (3d Cir.), cert. 
denied, 419 U.S. 998 (1974), and to formulate election procedures 
and policies.  St. Margaret, 991 F.2d at 1152.  The NLRB's 
underlying factual determinations on this issue are supported by 
substantial evidence.  Although UPMC makes arguments that might 
be persuasive were we determining the matter de novo, it falls 
far short of showing that the NLRB abused its discretion when it 
determined that the skilled maintenance employees at the 
Presbyterian complex should be treated as a unit distinct from 
their counterparts at the Montefiore complex.   
                                A. 
         The NLRB rejected UPMC's argument that, under the final 
rule, the existing unit of skilled maintenance employees at the 
Presbyterian complex constituted an existing non-conforming unit 
as defined by 29 C.F.R.  103.30(f)(5).  113 N.L.R.B. at 1342.  
The NLRB, in its discretion, also rejected the Director's 
decision to consider the unit a single facility unit to which the 
single facility presumption applied.  Instead, the NLRB 
determined that the existing unit more accurately constituted a 
conforming, multi-facility unit.  Id. at 1341-42.  It based this 
decision on the fact that the health care center includes two 
previously independent acute care hospitals and consists of 
several, separate buildings, many of which are blocks away from 
the others.  The NLRB noted that, although some of the buildings 
are connected by tunnels and bridges, not all of the buildings in 
the Presbyterian complex are interconnected with the buildings in 
the Montefiore complex.  Thus, based on the peculiarities of 
UPMC, it concluded that the existing unit employees did not truly 
work at a single facility.  The NLRB expressly found that the 
existing unit conformed to the final rule, because, except for 
the four telecommunications workers the union sought to add, the 
unit encompassed all skilled maintenance employees within the 
Presbyterian complex. 
         In order to determine whether, after the hospital 
mergers, the existing unit remained an appropriate multi-facility 
unit or whether the skilled maintenance employees working at the 
Montefiore complex must be included, the NLRB, citing Dezcon, 
Inc., 295 N.L.R.B. 109 (1989), examined the traditional community 
of interest factors, which include:   
         geographic proximity, local autonomy, 
         employee interchange and interaction, 
         functional integration, terms and conditions 
         of employment, and bargaining history. 
Presbyterian Univ. Hosp., 313 N.L.R.B. at 1342. 
         Applying these factors, the NLRB found the following:  
1) the geographic proximity of the Presbyterian complex to the 
Montefiore complex has not had a substantial impact on the 
existing skilled maintenance unit's operations; 2) there is a 
lack of contact between the employees at the Presbyterian complex 
and Montefiore complex; 3) there is no interchange or interaction 
between the groups of Presbyterian skilled maintenance employees 
and Montefiore skilled maintenance employees, and there have 
never been any joint projects involving them; 4) the employees 
maintain their respective facilities; 5) material purchases are 
performed by the respective facilities; 6) job openings at a 
complex are posted within that complex first, then employer-wide; 
7) the telecommunications workers are located at the Presbyterian 
complex and are responsible for servicing the buildings within 
that complex; 8) Montefiore has its own switch system and is 
serviced by outside telecommunications contractors; and most 
importantly, 9) the Presbyterian skilled maintenance unit has a 
20-year-long history of successful and peaceful bargaining.  
There is substantial evidence in the record to support the NLRB's 
findings. 
         Based on its findings, the NLRB determined that the 
Presbyterian complex skilled maintenance unit remained a distinct 
and appropriate unit, and that adding the telecommunications 
workers would not change "the fact that Presbyterian's and 
Montefiore's skilled maintenance operations are distinct." 313 
N.L.R.B. at 1343.  Thus, the NLRB ruled that the existing unit 
remained appropriate and that the four telecommunications workers 
constituted all the employees who were residual to that unit.  On 
petition for enforcement of its order, the NLRB emphasizes the 
unit's successful and peaceful 20 year bargaining history and 
argues that including the four telecommunications workers does 
not pose a risk of disruption to the existing bargaining 
relationship, while including the 49 special maintenance 
employees at the Montefiore complex would cause a potentially 
disruptive and significant change in the unit's composition. 
                                B. 
         UPMC's main argument is that the NLRB violated its 
final rule by permitting a separate unit at the Presbyterian 
complex.  UPMC points to the words "all skilled maintenance 
employees" in the rule, 29 C.F.R.  103.30(a)(5), and argues that 
all skilled maintenance employees of UPMC must be treated as a 
unit, because, as a result of the mergers, UPMC now operates 
under a single Pennsylvania license.  Therefore, UPMC maintains, 
the NLRB cannot treat its Presbyterian and Montefiore facilities 
as distinct and must include the Montefiore skilled maintenance 
employees in a self-determination election.  
         In support of its argument, UPMC asserts that  
the final rule makes no distinction between acute care hospitals 
that are comprised of more than one facility or occupy more than 
one building and those consisting of only one facility.  The NLRB 
responds that the rule did not make that distinction because it 
was not intended to affect the NLRB's discretion to determine 
through adjudication how many facilities of a single employer (as 
opposed to which job classifications) to include in an 
appropriate unit.    
         We agree with the NLRB.  The rule simply does not 
circumscribe or guide the NLRB's discretion to determine the 
facilities to be included in a unit when health care providers 
merge (indeed, it neither considered nor requested evidence on 
this issue); it regulates the different job categories to be 
organized in appropriate units in the health care industry.  Nor 
does the NLRB's finding that UPMC consists of multiple facilities 
even though it operates under a single license for an acute care 
hospital contradict its final rule.  In that rule, the NLRB 
defined an acute care hospital to distinguish such institutions 
from other health care facilities; it did not delegate its 
discretion to make multi-facility determinations to state 
hospital licensing entities.  UPMC interprets the rule in an 
artificially restrictive manner which ignores both reality and 
the purpose for which the NLRB promulgated it. 
         The notices of proposed rulemaking and the final rule 
do not even begin to delve into the issues of mergers and 
multiple facilities of a single employer-hospital.  SeeCollective 
Bargaining Units in the Health Care Industry, 52 Fed. 
Reg. 25142-25149 (July 2, 1987) (notice of proposed rulemaking); 
53 Fed. Reg. 339000-33935 (Sept. 1, 1988) (second notice of 
proposed rulemaking); 54 Fed. Reg. 16336-16348 (April 21, 1989) 
(final rule).  They clearly indicate that analysis regarding the 
number of facilities to be included in a unit of, for example, 
skilled maintenance employees, will still be appropriate. See 53 
Fed. Reg. at 33903 ("[T]he proposed rule does not purport to 
address the issue of the appropriateness of a single facility 
when an employer owns a number of facilities, which the Board 
will continue to address through adjudication.  Manor Healthcare 
Corp., 285 N.L.R.B. [224 (1987)]."); see also 54 Fed. Reg. at 
16338 n.2 (The rule merely determines that job 
classification/scope of an appropriate unit within an acute care 
hospital need not be continuously relitigated, but the Board will 
still have to resolve issues of unit composition, including 
whether a single facility is appropriate.).  The fact that the 
final rule does not discuss merged hospitals made up of 
originally separate hospitals, health care providers operating 
hospitals made up of separate facilities, or state licensing 
terminology referring to the merger of two or more hospitals as a 
single hospital for licensing purposes, does not prevent the NLRB 
from considering the actual makeup of various health care 
entities in order to determine the appropriate number of an 
employer's facilities to which it must apply the eight bargaining 
unit categories.  Instead, it simply indicates that the rule does 
not address the issue.  Thus, UPMC's argument that the final rule 
decided unit composition issues is wholly unsupported and, in 
fact, contradicted by the rulemaking record. 
         Arguing that prior NLRB precedent requires us to deny 
enforcement of its order, UPMC cites St. John's Hospital, 307 
N.L.R.B. 767 (1992).  The NLRB in that case required that, if a 
union representing a non-conforming unit sought to represent 
residual employees, all residual employees had to be added to an 
existing unit by means of a self-determination election.  
Therefore, according to UPMC, if the telecommunications workers 
are allowed to vote to join the existing skilled maintenance 
unit, then all UPMC's remaining unrepresented skilled maintenance 
employees must be involved in the self-determination election.  
This argument is without merit. 
         St. John's Hospital does not control the NLRB's 
decision here.  First, unlike the situation in St. John's, the 
NLRB here found that the existing unit was a conforming unit.  
UPMC's approach in characterizing the existing unit and single 
facility units generally as "non-conforming units," reads a 
presumption into the rule that the only appropriate unit is an 
employer-wide unit.  We find nothing either in the rule or its 
rulemaking history to indicate that the NLRB created this unique 
presumption for acute-care hospitals.   
         Moreover, St. John's Hospital involved job 
classification, not multiple facility, issues.  Because the 
employer in St. John's Hospital had already recognized splintered 
units of five different types of skilled maintenance employees, 
the Regional Director found that a sixth unit made up of 
remaining, unrepresented skilled maintenance employees would be 
appropriate.  The NLRB, however, found that the five non- 
conforming units were more than enough and that a sixth unit of 
skilled maintenance employees would lead to further undue 
proliferation.  It therefore ruled that, in order to represent 
residual employees, the union must try to add them to one of the 
existing five non-conforming units, rather than create another 
non-conforming unit.  St. John's Hospital is plainly 
distinguishable.  The NLRB here simply chose not to disturb the 
existing Presbyterian skilled maintenance unit and permitted all 
employees residual to that conforming unit to join it. 
                                C. 
         UPMC argues that the NLRB failed to consider adequately 
the effect of the hospital mergers on the unit determination.  
The NLRB responds that it considered the effect of the mergers, 
but found, within its discretion, that the existing unit of 
skilled maintenance employees at the Presbyterian complex 
retained a sufficiently distinct community of interest to warrant 
its preservation as an appropriate multi-facility unit in spite 
of the mergers.  The NLRB's decision accords well with the Act's 
mandate that its unit determinations "assure to employees the 
fullest freedom in exercising [their] rights." 29 U.S.C.  
159(b).  Cf. NLRB v. Western Southern Life Insur. Co., 391 F.2d 
119, 123 (3d Cir.) (NLRB's single facility presumption accords 
well with Act's policies), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 978 (1968).  
This is not a case where the NLRB has determined that one group 
of skilled maintenance employees within the same building or 
facility as another group should constitute a separate unit.  
Substantial evidence exists to support the particular distinction 
found by the NLRB between the Presbyterian and Montefiore 
complexes, in light of the realities at UPMC.  By determining 
as a result of that distinction that the skilled maintenance 
employees at the Presbyterian complex constitute an appropriate 
unit, the NLRB did not abuse its broad discretion. 
         The NLRB's rulemaking process and the decision in 
Staten Island Univ. Hosp. v. NLRB, 24 F.3d 450 (2d Cir. 1994), 
further convince us that multi-facility analysis was not affected 
by the final rule and remains relevant to the NLRB's discretion 
to determine what group of any of the eight types of employees 
listed in the Rule constitute an appropriate unit in the health 
care industry.  In Staten Island, the court addressed the issue 
of whether the registered nurses at a North site facility could 
be treated as a separate bargaining unit from the registered 
nurses at a South site facility of the same hospital.  The 
separate facilities resulted from the merger of two separate 
hospitals.  The court stated that proper unit determination 
findings depend on "the degree to which employees in separate 
locations share a community of interests distinct from their 
interests as employees of the whole institution."  Id. at 454.  
The court in Staten Island measured the degree of shared 
interests by the same factors utilized by the NLRB in this case.  
Analyzing those factors, it found that the NLRB did not abuse its 
discretion by determining that the groups of registered nurses at 
the two different sites constituted separate bargaining units. 
                                D. 
         UPMC treats its skilled maintenance employees at 
Presbyterian and Montefiore as separate and distinct in serving 
their respective facilities.  UPMC has no plans to integrate or 
merge the work of the two maintenance departments.  The NLRB, 
accordingly, has merely applied its broad discretion to the 
particular circumstances of this case in finding the existing 
unit appropriate and in conformity with the Final Rule.  UPMC has 
not met its heavy burden to show that the NLRB abused its 
discretion in that determination. 
                                V. 
         In sum, we find that the NLRB did not abuse its 
discretion when it determined that the telecommunications workers 
could vote to include themselves in the existing skilled 
maintenance unit at the Presbyterian facility.  Likewise, the 
NLRB's decision that the skilled maintenance employees at the 
Montefiore facility did not have to be included in the existing 
unit was not an abuse of discretion.  We also find that the NLRB 
properly concluded that UPMC violated  8(a)(1) & (5) of the 
National Labor Relations Act by refusing to bargain with the 
Union concerning the four telecommunications employees who 
unanimously voted to be included in the existing skilled 
maintenance unit.  Therefore, we will deny UPMC's petition for 
review and grant the NLRB's petition for enforcement. 
 
Presbyterian University Hospital v. NLRB, Nos. 95-3048/3082 
 
SAROKIN, Circuit Judge, dissenting. 
                                                             
 
         I agree with the majority that there is substantial 
evidence in the record to support the NLRB's conclusion that the 
four telecommunications workers are appropriately considered part 
of the skilled maintenance workers bargaining unit.  I conclude, 
however, that the NLRB abused its discretion by applying the 
community of interest analysis to determine whether the 
Montefiore workers should be included in the skilled maintenance 
workers bargaining unit.   
         It is my view that under the Board's own Final Rule, 
the Board should no longer apply the community of interest 
analysis in determining appropriate bargaining units in the 
context of acute care hospitals.  Rather, in determining whether 
an existing bargaining unit in an acute care hospital should be 
expanded to include similar workers from a hospital with which it 
has merged, I think the Board should apply the single facility 
presumption -- a similar, but nonetheless distinct, standard -- 
and I would remand this matter to the Board for purposes of 
applying the standard.  Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.  
                                I. 
         In analyzing this case, I rely heavily upon the Board's 
motivation for promulgating the Final Rule, as well as the 
process it followed in doing so.  Accordingly, I will first 
present a brief history of the Final Rule. 
 
                                A. 
         In 1974, Congress passed the Health-Care Amendment to 
the NLRA, making non-profit hospitals -- which had been exempt 
from the NLRA -- subject to it.  St. Margaret Memorial Hosp. v. 
NLRB, 991 F.2d 1146, 1148 (3d Cir. 1993) (citing Pub.L. No. 93- 
360, 88 Stat. 395 (1974) (codified at 29 U.S.C.  152(14), 
158(d) and (g))).    As a result of this change, many disputes 
arose regarding the appropriate bargaining units in the health 
care industry, and the Board and the courts of appeals struggled 
to resolve these disputes, often disagreeing on the appropriate 
test to apply to make appropriate bargaining unit determinations. 
See, e.g., Mercy Hospitals of Sacramento, 217 NLRB 765, 767 
(1975) enf. denied on other grounds, 589 F.2d 968 (9th Cir. 
1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 910 (1979) (relying on history of 
separate representation and community of interest to conclude 
registered nurses are entitled to separate bargaining unit); NLRB 
v. St. Francis Hospital of Lynwood, 601 F.2d 404 (9th Cir. 1979) 
(favoring a "disparity of interests" standard over a "community 
of interests" one); Electrical Workers IBEW Local 474 (St. 
Francis Hospital) v. NLRB, 814 F.2d 697 (D.C. Cir. 1987) 
(disapproving of the "disparity of interests" standard);  seealso 
Collective Bargaining Units in the Healthcare Industry, 52 
Fed. Reg. 25,142 (July 2, 1987) (notice of proposed rulemaking) 
(collecting cases and explaining changes in jurisprudence).   
         By the late 1980s, the Board had become very concerned 
with the lack of uniformity in the jurisprudence of the 
adjudicative arm of the Board itself, as well as in the courts of 
appeals, regarding the standard to be applied when determining 
appropriate bargaining units in the health care industry: 
"[T]here is no one, generally phrased test for determining 
appropriate units in this industry that has met with success in 
the various circuit courts of appeal, and, unfortunately, parties 
have no clear guidance as to what units the Board, and courts 
will ultimately find appropriate." 52 Fed. Reg. 25,142 (notice of 
proposed rulemaking). 
         In an effort to remedy this problem, the Board engaged 
in notice and comment rulemaking in the late 1980s, with the goal 
of creating a Rule that would limit the need for "lengthy, costly 
litigation over the appropriate bargaining unit or units" in the 
health care industry.  Collective-Bargaining Units in the 
Healthcare Industry, 53 Fed. Reg. 33901 (Sept. 1, 1988) (second 
notice of proposed rulemaking).  The Board proceeded with the 
expectation that the process of notice and comment would allow it 
the opportunity to produce empirical evidence that it could then 
use to make appropriate unit determinations for acute care 
hospitals generally, "while not creating such undesirable results 
as excessive proliferation, interruption in the delivery of 
health care services, jurisdictional disputes, wage whipsawing, 
and the like."  Id.  In order to accomplish this task, the Board 
relied on past cases and information it obtained in the process 
of notice and comment and then applied an analysis very similar 
to a community of interest analysis to identify a "finite number 
of congenial groups displaying both a community of interests 
within themselves and a disparity of interests from other 
groups."  52 Fed. Reg. 25,146 (notice of proposed rulemaking).  
         Among the factors to be considered [when 
         determining the appropriate bargaining units 
         for acute care hospitals] will be uniqueness 
         of function; training, education and 
         licensing; wages hours and working 
         conditions; supervision; employee 
         interaction; and factors relating to 
         collective bargaining, such as bargaining 
         history, matters of special concern, etc. 
53 Fed. Reg. at 33905-06 (second notice of proposed 
rulemaking).  
         Following two notice and comment periods, the Board 
ultimately promulgated the Final Rule, 29 C.F.R. 103.30, 
defining eight appropriate bargaining units for acute care 
hospitals, see Majority Opinion, typescript at 7-8, and declaring 
that "[e]xcept in extraordinary circumstances and in 
circumstances in which there are existing non-conforming units, 
the [eight units] shall be appropriate units, and the onlyappropriate 
units, for petitions filed pursuant to section 
9(c)(1)(A)(i) or 9(c)(1)(B) of the National Labor Relations Act . 
. . ."  Id. (emphasis added).   
         Under the Final Rule, then, acute care hospitals are 
allowed eight, and only eight, bargaining units.  See American 
Hospital Association v. NLRB, 499 U.S. 606, 608 (1991) (upholding 
the validity of the Final Rule).  Further, the Final Rule 
necessarily permits only one bargaining unit of skilled 
maintenance workers at an acute care hospital unless non- 
conforming units already exist or there are extraordinary 
circumstances.  In the case of existing non-conforming units, 
however, where the Union itself seeks to open up the unit to 
residual skilled maintenance workers, it is required that 
"allunrepresented employees residual to the existing unit or units be 
included in an election to represent them."  St. John's Hospital, 
307 NLRB 767, 768 (1992) (emphasis added). 
                                B. 
         I think that the Board's motivation for promulgating 
the Final Rule, as well as the process it followed in doing so, 
demonstrates that the NLRB sought to end the case by case 
application of the community of interest analysis when 
determining the appropriate bargaining units in acute care 
hospitals.  The Board engaged in years of notice and comment, 
collecting empirical evidence to develop appropriate categories 
of workers in acute care hospitals in order to avoid the 
difficulties experienced by the Board and the courts in 
determining the appropriate bargaining units for hospitals.  It 
is my view that, with the promulgation of the Final Rule, the 
Board, and necessarily any reviewing courts, were put out of the 
business of applying the community of interest test to determine 
appropriate bargaining units in acute care hospitals.   
         I therefore conclude that the Board abused its 
discretion when it applied the community of interest test in the 
instant matter to determine whether the Montefiore skilled 
maintenance workers should be included in the same bargaining 
unit with the Presbyterian skilled maintenance workers.  That the 
community of interest test was applied here to determine whether 
workers in similar job categories but different locations should 
be part of the same bargaining unit, not whether workers in 
different job categories should, does not alter my conclusion.  
The Final Rule was intended to prevent the proliferation of 
bargaining units in the health care industry.  The Board's 
decision below and the majority's decision today, however, allow 
for the presence of multiple units of skilled maintenance workers 
in one acute care hospital; this is directly contrary to the 
Board's own Final Rule. 
                               II. 
         In rejecting the application of the community of 
interest test, however, I do not necessarily conclude that the 
Final Rule requires that the Montefiore skilled maintenance 
workers automatically be considered a residual non-conforming 
unit which should be included in the same bargaining unit as the 
Presbyterian skilled maintenance workers.  As the majority itself 
correctly notes, the Final Rule "does not circumscribe or guide 
the NLRB's discretion to determine the facilities to be included 
in a unit when health care providers merge,"  Majority Opinion, 
typescript at 17, but merely enunciates eight different 
bargaining units by job category.  Instead, I think that the 
appropriate question for the Board is whether the Final Rule 
applies to the UPMC as a whole, i.e. whether there may be eight 
and only eight bargaining units in the entire UPMC (only one of 
which may be a skilled maintenance workers unit) or whether the 
Final Rule applies separately to each of the five historically 
independent health care providers that comprise the UPMC such 
that the UPMC itself could ultimately have forty units (eight 
bargaining units times five health care facilities).   
         If the Final Rule is to be applied to the UPMC as a 
whole, then the skilled maintenance workers bargaining unit at 
the Presbyterian complex is a non-conforming unit in that it does 
not include all of the skilled maintenance workers at UPMC.  Upon 
opening itself up via representation elections, all residual 
employees, namely the skilled maintenance workers from 
Montefiore, must be included in the election under St. John's 
Hospital, 307 NLRB 767 (1992).  If, however, the Final Rule 
applies to each of the five health care units independently, then 
the only residual employees to be included in the Presbyterian 
complex's unit of skilled maintenance workers are the 
telecommunications specialists. 
         I believe this question is answered by applying the 
rebuttable presumption that single-facility units are appropriate 
in the health care industry, explained in detail in Manor 
Healthcare Corp., 285 NLRB 224 (1987).  This presumption is 
applied to determine whether employees working at different 
facilities operated by the same employer should be part of the 
same bargaining unit, or whether each facility should have its 
own bargaining unit. 
         According to Manor Healthcare, "[t]he Board has long 
held . . . that a single facility unit geographically separated 
from other facilities operated by the same employer is 
presumptively appropriate for the purpose of collective 
bargaining."  Id. at 225.  The rationale behind this presumption, 
explained in the context of retail store chains, is as follows: 
         The [e]mployees in a single retail outlet 
         form a homogenous, identifiable, and distinct 
         group, physically separated from the 
         employees in other outlets of the chain; they 
         generally perform related functions under 
         immediate supervision apart from employees in 
         the other outlets, and thus their problems 
         and grievances are peculiarly their own and 
         not necessarily shared with employees in the 
         other outlets. 
Id. (citing Haag Drug Co., 169 NLRB 877, 877-78 (1968).  An 
employer may rebut this presumption, however, upon a "showing of 
circumstances that militate against its appropriateness."  Id.  
In order to determine whether the application of the presumption 
is inappropriate, the Board considers such factors as the 
geographic proximity of the different facilities to one another, 
the degree of employee interchange and transfer, the functional 
integration of the facilities, the administrative centralization 
of the facilities, common supervision, and bargaining history.  
West Jersey Health System, 293 NLRB 749, 751 (1989).  Upon 
reviewing these factors, the Board is in a position to decide 
whether the degree of integration between or among the facilities 
is so great that the single-facility presumption is overcome. 
         The Board itself made clear in its Second Notice of 
Proposed Rulemaking that it considers the application of the 
rebuttable single-facility presumption appropriate in just the 
context that exists here.  In discussing hospital mergers and 
consolidations, the Board noted that "the proposed rule does not 
purport to address the issue of the appropriateness of a single 
facility when an employer owns a number of facilities."  53 Fed. 
Reg. at 33903 (second notice of proposed rulemaking).  It then 
explained that such determinations would continue to be addressed 
through adjudication, and cited to Manor Healthcare Corp., in 
which the single-facility presumption was applied.  Id. (citing 
Manor Healthcare, 285 NLRB 224).  Furthermore, the Board and 
other courts have consistently applied the rebuttable single- 
facility presumption to cases similar to the instant one.  Seee.g., Staten 
Island University Hospital v. NLRB, 24 F.3d 450, 
456-67 (2d Cir. 1994) (applying the single-facility presumption 
in concluding that separate nursing bargaining units are 
appropriate in merged hospital context); Children's Hospital of 
San Francisco, 312 NLRB 920, 928 (1993) (same), enforced sub 
nom.California Pacific Medical Center v. NLRB,    F.3d.   , 1996 WL 
333692 (9th. Cir. 1996); see also West Jersey Health System, 293 
NLRB at 752 (finding the employer's multifacility hospital 
rebutted the single-facility presumption and required 
multifacility units).  
         The majority believes, however, that the single- 
facility presumption should not be applied in this case.  It 
reasons that, because the Presbyterian complex is comprised of 
eight different buildings, its skilled maintenance worker unit 
should be thought of as a multi-facility unit, and thus the 
single-facility presumption does not apply.  Majority Opinion, 
typescript at 12.  I think the majority applies too literal a 
meaning to the word "multi-facility," appearing to believe that 
if employees work in different buildings of the same hospital at 
the same site, their bargaining unit is a multi-facility unit.  
As I understand it, however, the fact that one hospital is 
comprised of several different buildings does not mean that its 
workers' bargaining units are multi-facility bargaining units.  
If a hospital -- or any enterprise -- is comprised of several 
buildings on one site and has historically been an integrated 
unit, the single-facility presumption may apply to its bargaining 
units.  See, e.g., Hartford Hospital and New England Health Care 
Employee Union, 318 NLRB No. 3 (1995), 1995 WL 468326 at *4, *16 
(applying the single-facility presumption to a psychiatric 
hospital comprised of "several connected and unconnected 
buildings" and "four residential group homes . . . , two of which 
are located on the main campus and two of which are located in 
the surrounding community").   
         In my view, the skilled maintenance worker bargaining 
unit at the Presbyterian complex is a single-facility unit.  
While true that the Presbyterian complex is made up of eight 
separate buildings, these buildings comprise the same health care 
facility and always have; by all indications, the maintenance 
workers in the eight buildings comprising the Presbyterian 
complex always have been members of the same bargaining unit.  
The question for us to answer, I believe, is whether the unit 
should continue to be a single-facility unit in light of the 
merger.    
                               III. 
         I recognize that some of the factors to be considered 
in determining whether the single-facility presumption is 
rebutted are similar or identical to those considered in applying 
the community of interest analysis.  Compare NLRB v. St. Francis 
College, 562 F.2d 246, 249 (3d Cir. 1977) (noting that factors 
applied in the community of interest test include, inter alia, 
frequency of employee interchange, geographic proximity, 
integration of production processes, and history of collective 
bargaining) with West Jersey Health Systems, 293 NLRB at 751 
(noting that factories considered in determining whether single- 
facility presumption has been rebutted include, inter alia, 
employee interchange, geographic proximity, functional 
integration, administrative centralization, and bargaining 
history).  Indeed, I concede that I have found no cases in which 
the difference between the application of the community of 
interest analysis and the rebuttable single-facility presumption 
is discussed.  I nonetheless think that the way in which the 
standards are applied are different and may materially affect the 
outcome in this case.  
         Most importantly, in applying the single-facility 
presumption the Board looks at the facilities at issue as a wholerather 
than focusing on the bargaining unit at issue.  For 
example, in Manor Healthcare, the Board applied the rebuttable 
single-facility presumption to determine whether a union could 
represent the service, maintenance and technical employees at 
only one of the employer's three area nursing homes, or whether 
multi-facility bargaining units were appropriate.  Manor 
Healthcare 285 NLRB at 227-28.  In conducting its analysis, the 
Board did not consider only the integration of the service, 
maintenance and technical employees.  Rather, it looked at the 
functional integration of the nursing homes as a whole, including 
"joint activities or interaction for patient care," "joint 
outings for area patients," transfers of patients and employees, 
as well as administrative centralization and geographic 
proximity.  Id.  Similarly, when the Board applied the rebuttable 
single-facility presumption in West Jersey Health System, it 
looked at the degree of employee integration for all hospital 
employees, including nurses, skilled maintenance workers, supply 
room employees and clerks in the medical records department.  
West Jersey Health System, 293 NLRB at 750. 
         By examining the facilities as a whole, the Board can 
arrive at a conclusion that applies to all of the bargaining 
units for all of the different job categories.  Thus, if the 
Board concludes that the single-facility presumption applies to 
the Presbyterian complex, any other bargaining units it may have, 
such as nurse units or guard units, would also be single-facility 
units.  If the Board concludes the presumption was rebutted, then 
there would only be one skilled maintenance workers unit, one 
nurses unit, and one guard unit throughout the entire UPMC.   
         Under the majority's reasoning, by contrast, the 
Presbyterian skilled maintenance workers unit could be found to 
lack a community of interest with the Montefiore workers, but the 
nurses unit could be found to share one.  That would mean the 
UPMC management could be required to negotiate with two skilled 
maintenance worker units, but only one nurses unit.  Such an 
outcome leads to unit proliferation that the Final Rule sought to 
control, and it 
provides no sorely needed predictable guideline for recently 
merged hospitals regarding appropriate bargaining units. 
                               IV. 
         Accordingly, I would deny enforcement of the Board's 
Order to Bargain, vacate the portion of the Board's decision 
concluding that the Montefiore skilled maintenance workers need 
not be included in the representation election, and remand for 
application of the single-facility presumption.  I would direct 
on remand that the Board allow for more fact-finding on the issue 
of employee interchange among all employees at all the 
historically independent hospitals that comprise the UPMC as 
there is insufficient evidence on the record regarding this 
point.  
